ON JUDGING NOT Elizabeth Burns I must confess that I was rather surprised at the diversity of the responses to my article Radicals__and Divorce (SOF Mag 4, Winter 1990-91). In my article I suggested that radicals ought to tackle practical issues as well as theoretical ones and referred to the ethical issues surrounding divorce by way of illustration. I was well aware that divorce is a subject which evokes strong feelings. However, I thought that an appeal for opposition to the ultra-conservative view that divorce is never permissible would have been relatively uncontroversial in this magazine. But I have been attacked by members of the network both for being too judgemental, and for being too lenient.
In this article I propose to deal with the views of three of my critics - those of Aileen La Tourette who wrote on Divorce - and Mrs X (SOF Mag 5, Spring 1991), Eric S MacDonald who criticised both Aileen and myself in On Thro_wing Stones (SOF Mag 6, Summer 1991), and Stephen Broughton who wrote to me, and whose views I quote with his permission.
Two of my three critics - Eric and Stephen - suggested to me that argument about divorce is a waste of time. This seems rather strange since they have both taken the trouble to put forward arguments against my views. Eric concentrates on the usefulness of rational argument for those who are themselves undergoing a divorce, and suggests that, in such circumstances, a rational consideration of the issues is not appropriate. Stephen deals with the attitudes to divorce which are found amongst the population as a whole and thinks that there are so many views on the subject that it is useless to try to discuss it.
Although I would agree with Eric that divorce causes extreme anguish, I don't think this means that one ought not to try to think rationally about it. In the midst of a marital disaster one might not feel much like looking at one's situation rationally, but this does not mean that one should not make the attempt. I agree that one cannot ignore one's emotions. But the thoughts and behaviour to which they give rise often need to be controlled by reason. A human being without emotion is only half a human being - but a human being without reason is little more than an animal. Behaviour which is guided only by emotion can often cause conflict, while reason is an effective way to resolve such conflict. Literal or metaphorical shouting and screaming achieve little in the long run : only rational argument stands any chance of bringing about understanding of the situation and thus the kind of behaviour which takes into account the feelings and circumstances of all concerned.
Stephen suggested that, since there are so many opinions about divorce, it is a waste of time to continue to argue about it. Perhaps, he thinks, we should just let each person make up his or her own mind. Of course, each person will do this anyway, whether or not we bother to argue. But argument can influence people's opinions. It can sometimes enable them to see aspects of a problem which would not otherwise occur to them. And, although it may not be able to produce a definitive 'answer' which can be applied in every case, it can show that some possible solutions have untenable consequences and ought therefore to be ruled out. Since people's opinions, SOF Magazine 7, Autumn 1991 5 and the behaviour which results from these opinions, can often increase the pain of those undergoing divorce, this is a subject which must continue to be discussed.
Thus, argument, either in the midst of one's anguish, or concerning divorce in general, is not futile. If we are unfortunate enough to find ourselves involved in a divorce we need to know what the issues are so that we may act in the interests of all concerned. But we also need to understand these issues even if we are not personally involved, both in order to avoid increasing the pain of those in this situation, and, perhaps, in order to equip ourselves to offer an understanding and informed ear to those who are.
My motivation in writing was partly to suggest that we should not criticise divorcees without knowing their individual circumstances, and thereby increasing their suffering. I was therefore rather taken aback to be criticised, along with Aileen, by Eric - who made major assumptions about our circumstances - for increasing the suffering of divorcees by making judgemental pronouncements from 'on high'. Eric says that, in his view, "the two writers who have indulged themselves in speculation about divorce have not, themselves, indulged in it, and if they had, perhaps their ruminations would have led them deeper, until, when they hit rock bottom, they would have recognized the futility of doing this sort of reasoning from on high".
Well, Eric, when my postman brought me the SOF Magazine containing your article, he also brought me a solicitor's letter confirming my decree absolute. That unfortunate coincidence certainly increased my suffering.
So, contra Eric, I have 'indulged' in divorce. It is because I have 'indulged' that I am acutely aware of attitudes to divorce - which is why I chose to write about this subject. However, I didn't, and still don't, think that my personal experience is particularly relevant in this context. My experience and the strong feelings engendered by it prompted me to write, but it is the way in which one conducts oneself in such a situation which needs to be, and can usefully be, discussed.
A third criticism was that I spent a large part of my article dealing with, as Aileen says, "the easy cases" - those involving domestic violence, and so on. Aileen agreed with me that divorce is acceptable in such situations but suggested that anyone who does think that a marriage should continue in such circumstances is "too out of touch to be worth arguing with".
Well, strange as it may seem, there are plenty of people who do seem to hold this view. I thought that the examples I gave in my article illustrated this point.
Only this morning I heard the preacher on Radio Four's Morning Service assert that "some of Jesus' teaching is hard" and that "we should not try to wriggle out of the bits we don't like". And this means, according to this man, no divorce. Full stop. People such as the preacher in question cause untold misery to many who are divorced through no fault of their own. I don't think we canignore the many people who express such views. Unfortunately, we can't always choose who we argue with. I would suggest that, if there are people in the world who say things with which, with good reason, we profoundly disagree, we should at least make the attempt to show them why we think they are wrong.
Having mentioned Jesus' teaching, this leads me to consider a fifth criticism, made by Eric, that, since radicals are not necessarily Christians or even ex-Christians, there is no reason why they should take the alleged words of Jesus seriously. I might point out that the subtitle of my article was "A Practical Christian Ethic". In other words, I was only claiming to give a possible radical interpretation of Christianity for those who wish to remain Christians and therefore need to take the Bible, and Christ very seriously. Those who feel no connection at all with the Christian tradition and therefore think they have no need to take into account what the Bible says, even if only as a prelude to a rational rejection of it, are not obliged to read my article.
However, non-Christian radicals will almost certainly meet Christians who hold the kind of conservative views about divorce which I have described. They are unlikely to change such attitudes by attempting to disprove God's existence ; they are more likely to succeed if they are able to show, with the help of such arguments as those I have cited, that a more liberal approach to divorce is compatible with Christianity. Indeed, Eric reiterates some of these arguments - saying that Jesus was not a legalist, for example. Thus, a knowledge of what Christianity says about divorce and the ways in which we might understand this could still be useful, even to nonChristian radicals. But even if non-Christian radicals never find themselves confronted by conservative Christian attitudes to divorce, I would suggest that it is an issue which they should think about carefully and that in doing so they ought to take into account what other people (which includes Jesus I) have said on this subject.
Sixthly, I am accused of being too judgemental.
Aileen picks up on a rather flippant comment I made to the effect that, while divorce might be acceptable in extreme circumstances, if Mrs X takes a fancy to Mr Y and leaves Mr X for this reason alone then she is culpable. Aileen painted a vivid picture of a Mr X who has changed into a "yuppoid nightmare" and a Mr Y with whom, given her unworldly Buddhist tendencies, Mrs X is rather more likely to achieve self-fulfilment.
Well, I agree that it might be possible to argue that, in such circumstances, divorce is permissible. I did, after all, say that there are less dramatic circumstances than those I described which might be considered as grounds for divorce and that it isn't always easy to draw the line.
One could not, of course, come to such a conclusion about Aileen's Mrs X and Mr Y without either being, or knowing well, one of the two people concerned. 6 SOF Magazine 7, Autumn 1991 And, one hopes, before leaving Mr X, Mrs X would talk to him (if possible) about her unhappiness and consider his feelings and those of any children involved. One also hopes that both parties would consider possible ways in which the difficulties might be resolved before resorting to divorce. If, after all this, divorce still seems the best solution, then the situation can hardly be said to be as trivial as that in which my Mrs X and Mr Y were involved.
But cases like that one of my Mrs X and Mr Y, in which one partner deserts the other because someone else seems more attractive, or because marital responsibility seems too troublesome, do exist. For example, Professor Philip Sarrell of Yale University medical school recently said that "The frequency with which men abandon their wives after they become ill is shocking" (The Times, August 1991). And I still think that those who walk out of their marriages at the slightest provocation, leaving their partners and children emotionally devastated, financially insecure, and, sometimes, extremely ill, are culpable. If that amounts to being judgemental, then the accusation is justified.
A seventh criticism, made by Stephen, was that I was being too lenient in suggesting that divorce could ever be permissible. "Promises", he says, "must not be broken, despite the bad times". At first sight, this seems to be a rather strange 'radical' view since radicals tend not to believe in such specific moral absolutes. But one could agree that the human community has decided that promises must not be broken, because, if we all thought we could break our promises when we felt like it, society would collapse. I have a great deal of sympathy with this view and this is why I think that we cannot say divorce is automatically permissible, in any circumstances.
If we all thought that we could break the promises we made when we married when we felt like it, without making any attempt to resolve any problems that might exist, the already not inconsiderable divorce rate would increase still further, along with the sum total of human misery. Should I be fortunate enough to marry again, I would rather not have to worry that my husband would just up and go if I became ill and unattractive and someone younger, with film-star looks, an incredibly high 10, and lots of money appeared on the horizon. No doubt life with me would be less fulfilling, but self-fulfilment is not the only basis on which to live one's life - and Aileen does concede this point at the end of her article.
So I think that if I make a commitment to someone, I should take it very seriously. And if someone makes a commitment to me I expect this commitment to be taken equally seriously. But such commitment to one's partner also involves commitment to their continued well-being. Beating them black and blue - or turning into a 'yuppoid nightmare' and expecting them to do likewise - does not constitute commitment to their continued well-being. Thus, if I found myself being treated in such a manner, I would not feel that I ought to maintain my part of the 'commitmentbargain'. If my partner breaks it, and the problem cannot be resolved, then I am not obliged to stay.
Catastrophes happen - one cannot help being ill, for example - and we have to weather those ; but no one should be expected to keep on tolerating extreme and voluntary bad behaviour.
Because some divorcees are culpable (as I suggested in answer to the sixth criticism), we ought not to assume that they all are (my reply to the seventh criticism). Ironically, criticism number eight, from both Aileen and Stephen, is that, contra my article, no matter what the circumstances, both partners are responsible. So, even if my husband beats me to a pulp, I am in some way responsible for this. All human beings have faults, but does a woman who is battered by her husband necessarily have more faults than the rest of us ? Such a view seems rather odd, especially from Aileen who thinks I am being too judgemental.
In conclusion, I think there is a middle way between 'no divorce' and 'divorce for any reason'. If we accept either of these extreme views, much suffering is liable to result. This middle way is not always easy to find. I do think that divorce is not an acceptable course of action in some cases. But this does not amount to throwing stones. Some divorcees may have been culpable, but, once a divorce is past history and those concerned are no longer in a position to do anything to improve the situation, assuming that they have learned something from it and fully intend never to treat anyone else in the same manner, they should be allowed to put it behind them and get on with the rest of their lives.
Even if radicals no longer believe in the traditional God, this does not preclude the possibility of forgiveness. Eric suggests that the point of the biblical story about the adulterous woman is that she had not sinned, but I think that this distorts its meaning. The point is that she had sinned - although this made her no worse than the rest of us since we all sin, even if not in quite the same way. But, more importantly, she was allowed to make a new beginning. Those who have been guilty should not be made to feel eternally guilty.
I suggested that there are cases in which divorce is acceptable and that we should not automatically assume that all divorcees are guilty. And, of course, there are cases in which it is difficult to decide whether or not a particular person is guilty - perhaps even those concerned will not always be able to decide. There are no hard and fast rules, no clearly drawn lines. But this is not to condemn forever those who were divorced in less than acceptable circumstances. However, this does not imply that divorce is a/ways a reasonable course of action. I have tried to suggest that, should we be unfortunate enough to find ourselves in a situation in which we need to decide whether a divorce is justified, there are certain principles which can be applied to each particular case which will help those involved to decide how to act for the good of all concerned.
ELIZABETH BURNS is researching a PhD at Cambridge concerning realist and anti-realist versions of radical Christianity. She is on the SOF Steering Committee and a member of the planning group for SOF V.