As the housekeeper who has scrubbed the floor sees to it that the door is shut, so that the dog does not come in and undo all the work with his muddy paws, so religious and philosophical thinkers have gone to great pains to see that no animals enter and upset their system of ethics.' Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) was a polymathic figure: physician, musician, biblical scholar, preacher, philosopher and theologian. He is chiefly remembered in theological circles for The Quest of the Historical Jesus, or more broadly for his medical mission in Africa and his interpretations of J.S. Bach’s music. But Schweitzer considered his most meaningful contribution, the one for which he wished to be remembered, to be his ethic of ‘reverence for life’ (Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben). Although the concept of reverence for life is known, it has been subject to a range of distortions and so it is important to confront these in order to understand what Schweitzer meant by these three words and how they shaped his religious attitude to animals.
The first distorting lens is legalism. Contrary to many commentators, Schweitzer does not propound reverence as a moral law, but rather as ‘ethical mysticism’. Ethical mysticism emerges from reflection upon the key concept ‘will-to-live’, a term gleaned from his philosophical investigations into the German tradition of idealist metaphysics. Indeed, one of Schweitzer’s favourite (and perhaps most perplexing) mantras was that ‘ethics is the very manifestation of our will-to-live.” Schweitzer’s specific use of the term ‘will-to-live’ is derived, not without modification, from Arthur Schopenhauer.
He follows Schopenhauer’s conviction that the essence of the thing-in-itself, which is accepted as underlying all phenomena, is the will-to-live. The will-to-live is seen by both thinkers as woven into the fabric of our existence and the sine qua non of life. Schweitzer writes that ‘philosophising means experiencing our consciousness as an emanation of the will-to-live.”? That is, since the basis of one’s self is experienced as will-to-live, Schweitzer believes the basis of all animate phenomena in the world, by ‘analogy’ with himself, similarly to be the will-to-live. He is concerned then with the claim that an understanding of human nature is simultaneously an insight more generally into the nature of reality. His metaphysics begin with the supposition that, despite the diversity and multiplicity of individual things in the world, all manifest the same inner essence, a will-to-live.
The will-to-live itself is not seen as the direct source of its value. The origin of value lies in the ‘infinite Will-to-live’, Schweitzer’s philosophical code word for God: through the will-to-live ‘my existence joins in pursuing the aims of the infinite Will-to-Live of which I am a manifestation ... and thus I give my existence a meaning from within outwards.’ Value comes not from human estimation, but from the view that the human will-to-live — and all life — are of a shared source in God. Crucially, Schweitzer returns to the finite manifestations of life and presents human moral action as the locus of mystical relation: ‘in loving self-devotion to other life we realize our spiritual union with the Divine.” The second distorting lens is inviolability. Many commentators have assumed that reverence for life upholds the moral inviolability of all life. It is true that Schweitzer sometimes writes in such a way as to invite this misunderstanding. The ethical person is one who: ...tears no leaf from a tree, plucks no flower, and takes care to crush no insect. If in the summer he is working by lamplight, he prefers to keep the window shut and breathe a stuffy atmosphere rather than see one insect after another fall with singed wings upon his table.° At first sight the sheer practical impossibility of these injunctions presents itself. But what Schweitzer offers here are not rules but rather examples of the type of action expected from one who upholds reverence for life. Indeed, the very word “reverence” (Ehrfurcht) indicates that he is not depicting obedience to moral law but concerns a ‘new temper of mind’ The third distorting lens is inconsistency. Since Schweitzer defines reverence as an ‘absolute’ ethic which enjoins ‘responsibility without limit towards all that lives’, it is perhaps not surprising that reverence is judged to entail inconsistency in practice. Indeed, Schweitzer is not immune from such charges since, for example, he notoriously had fish caught to feed his sick pelicans. Such inconsistencies are made more glaring in the light of his rejection of any moral hierarchy: ‘the ethics of reverence for life makes no distinction between higher and lower, more precious and less precious lives.’ Schweitzer is often interpreted at this point as suggesting that no form of life should ever be destroyed and that all creatures, humans to microbes, should have the same moral worth. It is doubtful whether this was his intention. Rather what he is doing is rejecting here the long tradition of hierarchy that places humanity at the top of the pyramid of descending moral worth. Schweitzer readily and regretfully admitted that it is sometimes necessary to make choices between various forms of life. But what he wanted to emphasize was the irreducibly subjective (anthropocentric) nature of these declarations.
Having clarified aspects of Schweitzer’s thought, it is now possible to indicate three of his contributions to religious and ethical attitudes to animals.
The first contribution concerns service to life as practical mysticism. In contrast to most mystics, Schweitzer maintains ‘,..we are to perceive each manifestation of life for itself, and no longer for ourselves’ that union with the Divine is achieved not through contemplation, but primarily through service to other life: ‘It is through the community of life, not community of thought, that I abide in harmony with the Divine. This is the mystical experience of ethics.’? In short, the phenomenon we call life is not something put here for our use or pleasure; we are part of life and our role is to enhance and serve each and every manifestation of it.
Schweitzer’s second contribution concerns his protest against an anthropocentric view of creation. In a 1919 sermon he questioned whether humans should be considered the goal of creation: ‘The purpose of nature, with her thousands of appearances of life, is not understood as merely the presupposition of man’s existence, ...and humanity may not conceive of itself as the purpose of the infinite world.’” Schweitzer’s rejection of the elevation of humans in the universe suggests a transformation of our relationship to other life: we are to perceive each manifestation of life for itself, and no longer for ourselves.
Building on these insights, Schweitzer challenges the idea that humans’ sole responsibility in the world is to take care of their own species. In his exegesis of the parable of the Good Samaritan, he seeks to expand our understanding of neighbor:
What is the sort of love toward God which compels us to be kind to others? What does love for our neighbour mean? ... The presupposition of morality is to share everything that goes on around us, not only in human life but also in the life of all creatures. " Schweitzer’s reading of the parable develops Jesus’ refusal to limit the extent of neighbor love by extending the category of neighbour to include all life: reverence does not draw a circle of well-defined tasks around me, but charges each individual with responsibility for all life within his reach and forces him to devote himself to helping that life.
Similar to Jesus’ rejection of a racially restrictive criterion of neighborly discrimination, Schweitzer counters the limiting structures of communal proximity by highlighting humans’ participation in the community of life.
The third contribution concerns non-injury to life as the central ethical imperative. A man is truly ethical, Schweitzer writes, ...only when he obeys the compulsion to help all life which he is able to assist, and shrinks from injuring anything that lives. The time is coming when people will be astonished that humankind needed so long a time to learn to regard thoughtless injury to life as incompatible with ethics.” He was deeply critical of animal experimentation, opposed sport hunting, and eventually embraced a vegetarian diet. As he saw it, his life was his argument.
Schweitzer’s religious attitude to animals was perhaps most shaped by his sensitivity to suffering life. He repeatedly drew attention to ‘the cry of Fellowship of those who bear the Mark of Pain’. The Fellowship of Pain certainly included the human community. But it also extended beyond humankind: ‘We all, when we see suffering, must be challenged by a desire for redemption, to help all creatures.’® Schweitzer connects the suffering in the world with service to other life. But the problem of suffering is not resolved in this world. His eschatological hope for the redemption of creaturely suffering is as inclusive as reverence. Schweitzer lauds St Paul’s vision in Romans 8:22 which ‘speaks of the longing of the whole creation for redemption’ and that displays ‘his sympathy with the animals.’ Schweitzer writes of the cosmic scope of Christian eschatology, highlighting the import of God’s future as one not merely for humans but for the whole creation which groans and sighs.
Schweitzer regarded traditional philosophical and religious ethics which restricted their scope to human relations as spiritually impoverished. In its place he offered a new vision: ‘We need a boundless ethic which will include the animals also.’ To reverence life and to serve it: this is the heart of Schweitzer’s commitment. His personal and intellectual legacy continues to hold strong moral appeal and serve as an inspiration for a wider ethic of life.
Dr. Ara Paul Barsam D.Phil. Oxon completed his doctoral studies at Oxford University on Albert Schweitzer's theology and now is a Visiting Professor of Ethics at Yerevan State University in the Republic of Armenia. 1. Albert Schweitzer, The Teaching of Reverence for Life, Richard and Clara Winston (trans) (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965) p. 49. 2. Albert Schweitzer, ‘The Ethics of Reverence for Life’, Christendom (Winter 1936) p. 229. 3. Albert Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilisation, C. T. Campion (trans) (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1950) p. 264. 4. Ibid, p. 305.
Albert Schweitzer, Indian Thought and Its Development, C. B. E. Russell (trans) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1936) p. 264.
The Philosophy of Civilisation, p. 310.
Ibid, p. 83.
The Teaching of Reverence for Life, p. 47.
Ibid, p. 44. 0. Albert Schweitzer, A Place for Revelation: Sermons on Reverence for Life, Martin Strege and Lothar Stiehm (eds) David Larrimore Holland (trans) (New York: Macmillan Press, 1988) p. 40. 11. Ibid, p. 119. 12. The Philosophy of Civilisation, p. 310. 13. Albert Schweitzer in Erica Anderson The Schweitzer Album (New York: Harper & Row, 1965) p. 162. 14. Albert Schweitzer, ‘Philosophy and the Movement for the Protection of Animals’, The International Journal of Animal Protection (May 1935). 15. Albert Schweitzer, in Charles Joy (ed), The Animal World of Albert Schweitzer: Jungle Insights into Reverence for Life (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1950) p. 30. a BIg) i SO: