Exploring and promoting Science (as a human creation) y realism in science I mean the Be that there exists a correspondence of the concepts of science with a description of nature as it really is. That is, the abstract terms used by scientists, such as quarks or electric fields, really do correspond to something out there; or to use some philosophical jargon, science is about finding the correct ontology of the world.
Of course naive realism is not really possible. As is well known, the older classical concepts of physics have been replaced by newer concepts, casting doubt on the metaphysical significance of the older concepts.
For example, classical electromagnetism has as its main concept a continuous electric field. It is known at the quantum level that this concept breaks down. Similarly the Newtonian concept of gravity as a force which acts between two bodies at a distance has been replaced by Einstein’s concept of gravity appearing as an effect arising from the distorting effects of space/time on _ the trajectories of bodies which then give “The ultimate realist dream of a final description of nature as it really is can only be a myth and, I would say, impossible to achieve.” the impression that they have been attracted to each other. So as science develops, older concepts are replaced by newer ones which may have quite different metaphysical implications.
Hence if one believes that science is a developing subject, any claim to the finality of a given system as providing an accurate description of nature must be subject to some degree of uncertainty.
Associated with realism is the position of reductionism which would seek to explain everything in terms of a few basic entities. What these entities are is of course subject to review, though the claim is often made by some high-profile physicists such as Stephen Hawking that we are near the end of the process of finding a grand unified theory, or theory of everything. Once this has been found then in principle everything we observe can be explained.in terms of these fundamental entities. This has quite a destructive effect on other disciplines which aren’t scientific as the claim is made that, for example, our aesthetic and spiritual responses to the world around us are really just particular states of the brain and if we wish to understand these disciplines we have to understand the mechanisms of the brain and ultimately the mechanisms of the brain will only be understood in terms of quantum theory. It is interesting that for a biologist, on the other hand, the ultimate explanation is seen in terms of our genetic make up.
A more sophisticated position, first articulated by Karl Popper in his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery, is that of critical realism. Popper concedes that the concepts of science are subject to revision as time develops, so that we may not claim with any degree of certainty that our current position in science is the correct one.
However, we can speak of the refutation or falsification of previous ideas and as time progresses we gradually build up a more accurate description of nature: science progressing by means of conjecture and refutation. What impressed Popper was the ability of scientists to construct tests of their theories which could be refuted by confrontation with experiment. He then used this to criticise the claims of Marxists and Psychoanalysts to be scientific as he claimed they had no means of falsifying their theories. If, as is claimed by some physicists (although it does seem a long time in coming), they are on the verge of a grand unified theory or a theory of everything, then presumably the claim by realists is that this process will end eventually and we will have finally arrived at the ultimate truth about reality.
The problem with this position is that it just is not true that theories are falsified. If they were, that would invalidate most of what goes on in scientific and engineering establishments up and down the country. What is true is that the limits of applicability of previous theories have been found, but nevertheless in their domain they are still valid. A civil engineer is quite happy to use Newtonian physics to design bridges; or, in my own field, I use the concepts of classical electro-magnetism to model and predict the behaviour of proposed designs of antennas. I really don’t need to use the concepts of particle physics to understand how antennas work. I would go further and claim that these concepts are totally irrelevant for my day-to-day work. I cannot conceive how I would begin to model an antenna using particle physics or quantum theory.
This simple fact causes a real problem for those who would claim any ontological significance for the concepts of Science. To believe the hype which surrounds the claims of particle physicists and cosmologists that once the grand unified theory has been discovered then the rest is a mere working out of deductive Principles, is to fall into a dangerous trap. We have been here before with Dirac’s claim that chemistry is just “The problem with many philosophers of science is that they focus on what are seen to be fundamental branches of science, such as particle physics or cosmology, or in biology genetics, but not much is said as to what scientists do in their day-to-day work.” applied quantum physics. Many chemists would disagree. The problem with this position is that by focusing on what “really” may be going on at the atomic level in any chemical reaction, the qualitative nature of much of chemistry has been destroyed. It is true that applications of quantum physics to chemistry have greatly enriched the subject and have opened up whole new areas of research, such as _ molecular spectroscopy, but here again even at the quantum level considerations of particle or nuclear physics are irrelevant and will not add anything to what is already known.
All this means that any claim that the concepts of each particular science outside their own particular domain can be applied to other branches must be questionable. The ultimate realist dream of a final description of nature as it really is can only be a myth and, I would say, impossible to achieve.
The problem with many philosophers of science is that they focus on what are seen to be fundamental branches of science, such as particle physics or cosmology, or in biology genetics, but not much is said as to what scientists do in their day-to-day work. This distorts the whole nature of the scientific enterprise. As has been pointed out by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, most of science is the “routine” working-out of the consequences of a well known _ paradigm. It is unfortunate that this so called “normal” science has had such a bad press because it is seen as boring or routine, when in fact one of the thrills of science is to explain certain unexpected phenomena in terms of the laws applicable to that particular domain.
To give two examples from classical physics: When any liquid is heated from below between two glass plates, at a certain temperature, a hexagonal pattern appears. This was first noticed by Benard at the turn of the last century. The physicist Rayleigh, using the laws of fluid mechanics, was able to make an accurate prediction at which temperature this phenomena would occur, and also provide an explanation in terms of the mathematics as to why the qualitative phenomenon of the hexagonal shape should occur. Experiments were subsequently done which were able to confirm the predictions for a variety of conditions. However, any claim that this particular piece of physics has applicability to particle physics would be ludicrous and conversely it is difficult to see what relevance atomic or particle physics has in explaining this phenomena.
Another example is the physics of gyroscopes, which have at first sight highly counterintuitive. behaviour.
Indeed the claim was made by the engineer Eric Laithwaite, in a series of well publicised broadcasts, that Newton’s laws of physics were violated by their behaviour. Of course this claim did not stand up to any critical scrutiny. If one is careful enough, one can build detailed models of gyroscopic motion based on Newton’s Laws but it does require quite a good deal of clever mathematics to fully understand their behaviour. In general terms, it is this detailed modelling and analysis which forms the stuff of day-to-day science, and which tends to be neglected by philosophers of science who concentrate on what they see as the conceptual issues.
I cite these examples of normal science as I think some important lessons can be learnt as to what scientists actually do in their day-today work. At the risk of generalisation, it is not the case that scientists are concerned’ with providing a description of nature as it really is. Rather they are concerned to make concrete predictions about certain phenomena in terms of fundamental principles applicable to the particular domain. However, it is not true that outside the limited domain any general claim to the applicability of the concepts holds or that a supposedly more fundamental branch of science has any relevance to the particular domain.
All of this poses real problems for those such as Arthur Miller who claim a realist understanding of science because each of the concepts may have completely different metaphysical implications which are incommensurable with each other. Given that on these grounds alone realism seems untenable it seems incredible to me that such claims are made.
Is there some way of understanding the work of scientists which is free from all taints of realism? I believe there is. The American philosopher of science Van Frassen in his book The Scientific Image outlines a strong case for replacing realism with notions of empirical adequacy. Here, science is not seen to provide an overall unique description of nature, but rather the development of empirically adequate models applicable in limited domains.
This notion of empirical adequacy does not fall into the trap claimed by the more eccentric philosophers of science such as Feyeraband that science is just another form of Voodoo but it does prevent the rather grandiose claims made by realists, or even critical realists, about the absolute truths of the scientific enterprise.
One of the reasons why, since the early 1980s, particle physics has become quite sterile is that all the speculation about quantum gravity, superstrings etc. has not produced a single empirical prediction. And it “Particle physics, cosmology and the scientific enterprise as a whole are brilliant testimonies to the creativity of the human spirit.” seems highly unlikely that they ever will, as the energies at which such effects will be observed are beyond anything we can possibly reach. It is true that in the seventies particle physics made rapid progress with the development of the standard model of particle physics, but this model involves at least 19 arbitrary parameters which have to be empirically determined, and so far attempts to move beyond the model have not produced anything conclusive. Once the parameters have been established, the standard model can make impressive predictions about the results of particle physics experiments and have some limited applications in cosmology, but its impact on other branches of science has to be seen as minimal. Its success was guaranteed by the almost daily dialogue between theory and experiment.
To be more positive, disciplines such as particle physics, cosmology and the scientific enterprise as a whole are brilliant testimonies to the creativity of the human spirit. Rather than taking the realists’ view that science is about discovering the fundamental laws of nature, we should see the efforts of scientists as one of the many attempts by mankind to impose a certain degree of conceptual unity on the variety of human experience. The so-called laws of science are just as much human constructs as religion or the arts. This view has had a_ respectable philosophical pedigree ever since Kant’s so-called Copernican revolution. Given this, science can take its place alongside other disciplines as having a certain degree of insight into certain particular problems but to claim that it alone has the possession of ultimate truth is to fall into the realms of fantasy and needs challenging. Otherwise, all we will end up with is a new form of fundamentalism, with all the destructive implications that will entail. Indeed it is arguable that this has already happened.
Chris Finlay is convenor of the Scottish SoF Group You’re Telling Us!